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Mandate,
Independence, and the Formation of a Political System.
The history of Lebanon as a separate
entity from its neighbours began many thousands of years
ago, long before the modern state was born. In fact it
is doubtful whether any country in the Middle East apart
form Egypt can claim such a long and continuos history
as a separate political entity. Certain unique features
had appeared as far back as the Byzantine Empire, but
the modern Lebanese entity emerged in the late 16th
century during the rain of Fakhr al-Din II when within
its territory an evolving form of political authority
continued without interruption to our own time, giving
Lebanon and the Lebanese a separate and distinct
identity and a strong sense of nationality. Over the
years, so successfully did the Maronites consolidate
their power that much of their territory had grown
virtually independent by the second half of the 16th
century. The effort to maintain this independence
dominated Maronite policy throughout the subsequent four
hundred years of Turkish aggression. Lebanese history
from the 16th century until 1840 largely records the
efforts of the Turk to divide the country, and the
efforts of one local emir after another to unite Lebanon
against Ottoman rule. On the whole the emirs were
surprisingly successful. Two among them, the Emirs Fakhr
al-Din II and Bashir II, were outstanding.
Fakhr al-Din was an exceptional man,
for fifty years (1585-1635) he planned, intrigued, and
fought for Lebanese independence, and in so doing
created the Greater Lebanon for the first time. Fakhr's
realm extended well beyond the current state of Lebanon.
His achievement cost him five years exile and finally
his life. In 1613 he was forced to fly the country, and
escaping on a French vessel found a welcome at the court
of the Medicis. Eighteen years after his return to the
Lebanon, he left the country again, a prisoner, going to
his death at Constantinople. He was a capable,
imaginative and ambitious man, Fakhr al-Din's
administration laid the foundations of a security which
made the Lebanon in the 17th and 18th centuries the
safest district in the Turkish Empire. The resulting
co-operation of Druze and Christian was, for nearly two
hundred and fifty years, an embarrassment to the Turks.
Fakhr al-Din's contacts with the Florentine Renaissance
were as useful to him, in the pursuit and elaboration of
his policies, as were his Florentine engineers in the
execution of infrastucture projects such as his harbour
works. Fakhr was a remarkable prince, his reputation was
outstanding in his lifetime.
Throughout Emir Bashir's life of over
eighty years (1767-1850) he dominated the fortunes of
Lebanon, disputing its control with all comers, and
extending its territories and autonomy almost to the
limits achieved by Fakhr al-Din. Bashir's extraordinary
career, with its no less extraordinary vicissitudes, he
had to flee the country on four occasions, coincided
with a period in which Lebanese affairs were taking a
new and yet more complicated turn. Since Napoleon's
expedition the western powers had intervened
increasingly in Turko-Lebanese politics, and even the
Emir, scheming in his mountain palace, found it at times
impossible to play off the many interests involved.
There was also a serious deterioration in Maronite-Druze
relations and their fruitful co-operation was drawing to
an end. This was primarily due to Druze jealousies and
apprehensions which were exploited and encouraged by the
Turks and apparently also by the English. Further the
Maronite and Druze communities were undergoing
structural alteration and their old feudal organization
was breaking down. As long as the Emir Bashir, who could
command the obedience of both parties, remained in power
there was no serious open rupture. Not until his final
exile in 1840 did the trouble develop which was to
culminate in the Druze massacre of the Maronites in
1860. This event, by precipitating the intervention of
the European powers, marked a new era in the history of
the Mountain. Owing to European pressure and a French
military expedition, the Porte was compelled to provide
for the peculiar position of the Mountain and officially
to recognize the autonomy for which the Maronites had so
long struggled. A Lebanese enclave was created, much
smaller than the Greater Lebanon, it was given a
Christian governor and depended directly from the Porte
rather than from the local pasha. This arrangement
persisted until the First World War.
The war hit Lebanon hard. The Turks
commandeerd Lebanon's food supplies and requisitioned
its beasts of burden and so caused hundreds of thousands
of deaths from widespread famine. The land also became a
paradise for disease and plagues claimed thousands of
souls. During this period, Lebanon suffered more than
any other Ottoman province, loosing over one third of
its population to slow and painful deaths.
At the end of the First World War, in
an attempt to ensure that the suffering they had
experienced over past years would not happen again, the
Maronites demanded a state whose boarders were those
established naturally by the Lebanese of times gone by,
a Greater Lebanon. The Maronites wanted a state which
would be large enough to stand on its own and one in
which the Lebanese could control their own destinies.
They based their demands on appeals to history,
geography and economics. In Paris, after the war the
Lebanese claims were pressed by the Central Syrian
Committee of Shukri Ghanim and by delegations sent by
the Maronite Patriarch, Elias Huwayyik.
On 10 November 1919, in a letter to
Huwayyik, Georges Clemenceau, the French prime minister,
committed France to support an independent Lebanese
state and in April 1920 the San Reno conference gave the
mandate over Lebanon and Syria to France. The mandate
was an innovation in international relationship. Credit
for its origination is given to General Smuts of South
Africa and President Wilson of the United States. In the
act of the mandate Lebanon and Syria were acknowledged
as class A and included in the same document. One high
commissioner was appointed for both. The principle
underlying this class was expressed in Article 22 of the
covenant of the League of Nations:
'Certain communities formerly
belonging to the Turkish Empire have reached a stage of
development where their existence as independent nations
can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering
of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory
until such time as they are able to stand alone. The
wishes of these communities must be a principal
consideration in the selection of the Mandatory.'
As a matter of fact only the United
States sent a commission to ascertain the "wishes of
these communities". Its report, never published
officially, left no doubt about Syrian determined
opposition to the French mandate. But in Lebanon the
vast majority favoured the French mandate and demanded
an independent Greater Lebanon from Tripoli to Tyre.
The act of the mandate recognized in
principle the independence of both Lebanon and Syria but
it was flawed as it lacked implementation for the
attainment of that end. It set no specific time limit
for the duration of the mandate and fixed no criteria
for measuring the people's attainment of capacity for
the full exercise of self-government. It left the minor
at the mercy of the trustee. The entire act of mandate
bears the marks of a hasty and careless document. One
article put French side by side with Arabic as official
language but maintained Arabic as the medium of public
instruction. Of its twenty articles only one, dealing
archaeology, was given any thought and is analysed and
subdivided into eight sections, constituting a sixth of
the entire text. The mandate had to start from scratch.
Its task was no less than creating and developing
administrative, legislative and judiciary agencies
concerned with public safety and the execution of
justice, health and education and public works. A
provisional constitution for governing the new state and
determining its frontiers was promulgated. Lebanon had
no system of public education; one was devised, wholly
limited to the elementary level. Modern codes for civil
procedure were introduced. The Ottoman municipal law was
replaced (1922) by one enabling about a hundred and
twenty towns and villages to practise a measure of home
rule. Means of communication were improved. Special care
was bestowed on Beirut harbour, neglected since its
construction by a French company in 1889-94.
The mandate proceeded and between
1920 and 1925 Lebanon was ruled by French governors
assisted by advisory councils, the first three high
commissioners sent by France were generals with
distinction in the war as a main credential. Their
troops were largely Senegalese. Their aides were drawn
mainly from colonial service. The only system of rule
they knew was the familiar one, and so they needed to
adapt. Not only was the new situation calling for new
techniques but the country was at a new depth in its
economic, social, political and spiritual affairs. First
in the series of rapidly changing commissioners was
General Henri Gouraud, hero of the Marne and victor in
the battle against the Syrian army. On September 1,
1920, the high commissioner made the following historic
proclamation:
'At the foot of these majestic
mountains, which have been the strength of your country,
and remain the impregnable stronghold of its faith and
freedom, on the shore of this sea of many legends that
has seen the triremes of Phoenicia, Greece and Rome and
now, by a happy fate, brings you the confirmation of a
great and ancient friendship and the blessings of French
peace. I solemnly salute Grand Liban, in its glory and
prosperity, in the name of the Government of the French
Republic.'
Thus was Greater Lebanon reborn. The
area which belonged to it, geographically and
historically, was reunited. Christians formed a majority
of the population of Greater Lebanon comprising 55 per
cent of the population and the Maronites, while still
the largest single community, numbered one-third of the
whole. The second largest community at one-fifth of the
whole was the Sunni Muslims many of whom bitterly
resented the loss of their former supremacy under the
Ottomans and wanted to be part of a Muslim Greater
Syria. The advisory councils set up in 1920 were
replaced in 1922 by representative councils, which were
fashioned in a manner which was to be significant for
the future of Lebanon because deputies were elected on a
confessional basis, that is the seats were divided
proportionately among religious communities.
In 1926 the Lebanese Republic was
established under the constitution of 23 May 1926. The
transition from representative assembly to chamber of
deputies was not accomplished smoothly and in 1925-6 the
Lebanese political system passed through a major crisis.
In 1925 the representative council was abolished by
General Maurice Sarrail who disliked the whole
confessional system and proposed for Lebanon a quite
different mode of development, namely that Lebanon
should become a secular state. Sarrail wanted to end the
system of representation of religious communities, to
replace the administrative organization of Lebanon with
new arrangements which obliterated the old confessional
divisions, and to break the hold of the religious
communities on education which should henceforth become
the responsibility of the secular state. Sarrails
proposals encountered widespread opposition from most
religious communities in Lebanon and they were aborted
for this reason and also partly because of a Druze
uprising in Syria which Sultan al-Atrash tried to extend
into Chouf region of Lebanon.
The Lebanese constitution of 1926
preserved the confessional system established four years
earlier and in its origins dating back to the middle of
the nineteenth century. There was an elected chamber of
deputies, a senate nominated by the French high
commissioner on a confessional basis, a president and a
cabinet. The first president was Charles Dabbas, a Greek
Orthodox chosen by the commissioner at the time, Henri
de Jouvenal. Although French control was still secured
through the influence of the high commissioner, and also
through the control of military forces and the Common
Interests, the Lebanese Republic provided an arena in
which the political life of Lebanon could develop. In
the early years, however, that development was impaired
by the continued refusal of some of the population of
Lebanon to work the system. Many Sunnis were wholly
opposed to the state; the Shiites were suspicious,
although Shiite notables were more willing to
co-operate; and many Greek Orthodox, although concerned
about the prospect of Muslim rule, continued to resent
Catholic pre-eminence. The Druzes were divided: they
disliked Maronite domination but were in favour of an
independent Lebanon; some notables, like the Jumblatts
were willing to co-operate with France and some, like
the Arslans, refused.
Between 1926 and 1943 Lebanese
politics became directed towards the future of Lebanon
and maronite attempts to secure the co-operation of the
Sunnis. Many Maronites believed that Greater Lebanon
must always expect Muslim hostility and therefore should
lean wholly on French support. For much of his career
Edde took this view as did his great rival, Bishara
al-Khuri, in the early years of the state. Non Maronites
like Charles Dabbas and Fuad Arslan also thought French
protection essential. Faced with the difficulty of
securing this co-operation, Emile Edde, who in 1919 had
been one of the foremost advocates of a Greater Lebanon,
suggested abandoning the northern and southern regions
and leaving only the Mountains, the Bekaa Valley and
Beirut as the independent Lebanon. The vast majority of
Maronites, however, believed that in the long run a
Greater Lebanon could work only if the Muslims were
persuaded to accept it and eventually this view was
taken up by Bishara al-Khuri. For this to succeed, it
was necessary that first the generation of Sunni
politicians and notables with memories of Ottoman
domination should pass away and be replaced by a new
group whose attitudes were not shaped by the past.
A leading feature of Lebanese
politics was, and to a large extent still is, the
pre-dominance of notables. The Sunni notables resembled
those of Syria with their Ottoman education and
experience although their wealth often derived more from
their urban activities than from their land holding. The
cousins, Sami al-Sulh and Riyad al-Sulh, both of whom
had adopted Arab nationalist views before 1918, came
from an old Ottoman bureaucratic family from Sidon, but
settled in Beirut. Abd al-Hamid al-Karami and his son
Rashid al-Karami came from a religious family in Tripoli
which had held the office of mufti. Sa’ib Salam was the
son of a deputy in the Ottoman parliament from a Beirut
merchant family. An interesting personality was Shaykh
Muhammad al-Jisr, from a religious family in Tripoli
with a record of Ottoman service. He was one of the
earliest of the Sunni notables to co-operate with France
and served as president of the senate and later of the
chamber of deputies from 1926 to 1932. Another member of
an old Tripoli family was Khayr al-Din al-Ahdab who
moved to Beirut and established a newspaper which became
the vehicle for his Pan-Arab views. Later, he modified
his views and in 1937 he became the first Muslim prime
minister of Lebanon. The Shiite notables, on the other
hand, were usually large landlords. Prominent among them
were the Asads of the south and the Hamadas of the Bekaa.
The Druze leaders, like the Shiites, tended to favour
traditional status. In terms of status the leading
family was that of the Arslans but in terms of land
holdings the most wealthy were the Jumblatts. The
rivalry between these two families was an important
factor in Druze and Lebanese politics for it determined
with whom they would work.
The Christian notables had a rather
different background as most of them had studied in
non-Ottoman schools and colleges, notably at the Jesuit
college of St Joseph, and learned their political craft
in the autonomous district of Mount Lebanon. Many were
landowners but many also had moved into urban
occupations. The Greek Catholic notables, Michel Shiha
and Salim Taqia, were bankers. The Greek Orthodox were
often from long established merchant families like that
of the lawyer and millionaire, Petro Trad. Among the
Maronites there were many landowners but professional
men were the leaders in politics. Emile Edde was a Paris
educated lawyer, more at home in French than in Arabic.
Bishara al-Khuri, son of a civil servant who had served
in the old autonomous district, was also trained as a
lawyer. An interesting example of the composite nature
of the Christian notable was Camille Chamoun who came
from a land owning family in the Shuf but acquired a
legal education and entered politics: in the Shuf he was
a traditional notable; in Beirut a modern political
leader. A similar appearance was made by Sulieman
Franjieh from the north: in his stronghold of Zaghurta
he was a traditional figure while in Beirut he played
the modern game of politics. In the career of the
Lebanese notable the two elements balanced and supported
each other: his political base was his region; to reward
his followers he was obliged to seek office. To stand
aloof from politics altogether was a luxury which few
notables could afford; the new political arena reshaped
their traditional life.
In 1939 the world faced a second
great war. On September 9 1939, High Commissioner
Gabriel Puaux suspended the Lebanese constitution,
dissolved the chamber, restricted presidential power,
and declared martial law in both Lebanon and Syria. In
the summer of the following year, when France
capitulated to Germany and a collaborationist government
at Vichy replaced that of Paris, Puaux and the French
commander-in-chief of the entire Allied troops in the
Levant declared loyalty to Vichy as against the Free
French organized by General de Gaulle. De Gaulle had
refused to recognize the capitulation and advocated
continuing the fight. This move on the part of Puaux and
the French commander imperilled the British position in
Egypt, Palestine and Iraq. It further endangered the
whole war effort. In June 1941 British troops, assisted
by Free French units, expelled the Vichy and Axis forces
and occupied Lebanon and Syria.
General Georges Catroux was de
Gaulle's choice for governing the mandated territory as
delegategeneral and for commanding the troops of the
Levant. On November 26, 1941, Catroux proclaimed in the
name of his government and its ally the termination of
the mandate and the "sovereignty and independence" of
Lebanon and its sister Syria. Great Britain extended
immediate recognition to the two republics. The United
States lost no time in nominating a diplomatic agent and
consul-general. With the resumption of constitu- tional
life Lebanon in 1943 sent to the chamber deputies with
pronounced nationalist leanings. The chamber elected
Bisharah al-Khuri, a French-educated Maronite lawyer who
had held high government positions, as president of the
republic, and approved Riyad al-Sulh, a pro Arab Sunnite
leader who had been sentenced by Jamal Pasha to
"perpetual exile", as prime minister. It then proceeded
to purge the constitution of all references to France as
the mandatory and of all articles deemed inconsistent
with the new status. Find- ing the Lebanese authorities
unrelenting the delegate-general suspended the
constitution, arrested President al-Khuri, his prime
minister and other cabinet members and sent them into
exile in the castle of Rashayya. He declared martial law
and imposed strict censorship.
Nothing could have more infuriated
the public. Riots, demonstrations and strikes spread. A
wave of disgust swept through the Arab countries.
Lebanese emigrants in America and other lands bombarded
their governments with protests. Under pressure from
within and without France yielded. On November 21, after
eleven days of confinement, the exiles were returned
triumphant. With the reinstatement of the legal
authorities on the second day, now celebrated as a
national holiday, the constitutional institutions began
to function again. In the course of 1944 almost all
important French powers and services were transferred to
local hands. In February 1945 the republic, to qualify
for membership in the proposed United Nations, declared
nominal war on Germany and Japan. An engraved tablet on
that rock of ages at the mouth of the river north of
Beirut records:
On December 31, 1946, the
evacuation of all foreign troops from Lebanese soil was
completed in the days of His Excellency Bisharah al-Khuri,
president of the republic.
A key factor in the achievement of
Lebanese independence had been the co-operation of
Christian and Muslim politicians. This co-operation was
founded on an unwritten understanding about power
sharing known as the National Pact. Many earlier
proposals for securing Christian-Muslim co-operation in
Greater Lebanon had been based on the Sarrail model of
individual equality in a secular state. The National
Pact adopted the opposite approach and endeavoured to
secure co-operation in a pluralist polity in which power
was shared on a confessional basis. It incorporated both
the ideas of men like Michcl Shiha, a Greek Catholic
banker and one of the architects of the 1926
constitution, and the experience gained in working the
system since 1926. In many ways the National Pact merely
endorsed the practice of Lebanese politics.
To understand this power sharing
system it is first necessary to enumerate the religious
communities of Lebanon. The largest single community was
the Maronite, 29 per cent of the population in 1932,
located in the northern and central parts of Mount
Lebanon and in east Beirut. The second was the Sunni
Muslims, 23 per cent, mainly urban and in the coastal
towns of Tripoli, Sidon and Beirut. The Shiites, still a
predominantly rural community in 1943, had 20 per cent
and were located in the south and in the northern Biqa
The Greek Orthodox (10 per cent) were, like the Sunnis,
mainly urban but were also found in the Kura in north
Lebanon. Next came the Druzes (7 per cent) in the
southern part of Mount Lebanon, notably in the Shouf.
Greek Catholics (6 per cent) were a prosperous urban
community strong in Beirut and in the town of Zahle. The
remaining 5 per cent of the population consisted mainly
of Christian sects living in Beirut of which the most
important was the Armenians, essentially an exile
community whose politics were still formed around
earlier struggles for Armenia and a contest for control
of the Armenian church organization. The percentages
given for these groups are all from the 1932 census
although they no longer truly reflected the situation in
1943. In particular they overestimated the Christian
proportion and underestimated the weight of the Shiite
population. Nevertheless, they formed the basis of the
division of power agreed primarily by Maronites and
Sunnis. The division of power was as follows. The
president was to be a Maronite (as he had been since
1934), the prime minister a Sunni Muslim (since 1937),
and the president of the chamber of deputies a Shiite.
Representatives in the chamber of deputies were to be
apportioned on the basis of six Christians to five
Muslims, an arrangement introduced in the summer of
1943. Thereafter the number of deputies was a multiple
of 11. Confessional representation was also extended to
the cabinet. Cabinets consisted of eight or ten members
including two (or three) Maronites, two (or three)
Sunnis and one each from the Greek Orthodox, the Greek
Catholics, the Shiites and the Druzes.
By independence the ingredients
necessary for one to succeed in politics in Lebanon were
established. These were a land owning base with local
followers, urban wealth, modern skills and good
alliances. Landowners were the leading group in Lebanese
chambers down to independence and beyond falling from
nearly 60 per cent in the 1920s to 40 per cent in 1957
and only 10 per cent in 1968. In Lebanon, however, those
with modern skills came more quickly to the fore than in
other countries of the region. By 1929 lawyers already
numbered a quarter of the chamber and by 1943 they were
nearly 40 per cent. In this shift Christians took the
lead and Muslims followed. Lawyers also predominated in
governments. Between 1926 and 1972, 8 out of 12
presidents and 7 prime ministers were lawyers. The
proportion of lawyers in cabinets between 1943 and 1972
was between one third and two thirds. By contrast
businessmen did not go into government in large numbers:
only 6 per cent of members of Lebanese cabinets were in
this category. In the rise of the professional
politician one can begin to see the seeds of major
change in Lebanon, namely the passing of many of the
traditional notable families who could not well adapt to
the requirements of the new political arena. In 1936,
some 38 per cent of chamber seats were held by notable
families which dated back to the nineteenth century; by
1972 such families held only 7 per cent of seats. The
pre-eminence of a few families at the highest levels of
Lebanese politics was a phenomenon that was especially
pronounced among the Sunnis. Of 35 cabinets formed
between 1943 and 1964 no less than 31 were headed by
members of four families, the Solhs, the Karamis, the
Yafis, and the Salams. These Sunni prime ministers
formed alliances with the Maronite presidents.
From 1946 until 1958 the Lebanese
political system was successful in providing a basis for
considerable freedom and prosperity in Lebanon and with
some modifications after that year it continued to do so
until 1975. That it could do so depended upon it being
asked to do very little. Whereas in every other part of
the Near East one witnesses the often spectacular
expansion of government activity, during the same period
in Lebanon the government remained modest and
unambitious. The Lebanese economy ran with the minimum
of government control and with much success. Lebanon is
a small, densely populated mountainous country. Only
one-quarter of the land is cultivable with the
consequence that urbanization proceeded more rapidly in
Lebanon than elsewhere. By the late 1960s about 50 per
cent of the population of Lebanon lived in towns. Most,
however, did not work in manufacturing industry but in
construction or services. Of the gross national product
18 per cent came from agriculture, 12 per cent from
industry and 70 per cent from services. An economy based
upon private service industries is peculiarly well
adapted to flourish without government controls. In 1948
Lebanon had adopted a policy of free trade and free
currency exchange. Trade expanded and Beirut became the
leading banking centre of the Near East. The economic
and the political systems of Lebanon were in harmony. On
the other hand the benefits accrued especially to those
groups who controlled the service industries.
Agricultural and industrial workers were much less
content. For them increased state intervention in the
economy could bring increased prosperity.
By 1958 the pressures from those who
were discontented with the allocation of economic and
political benefits in Lebanon had become strong,
especially in Beirut whither had come migrants from
hitherto quiescent rural communities, notably the
Shiites. The discontented were mobilized by two
political leaders, Kamal Jumblatt and Sa'ib Salam who
formed a coalition called the National Front to
challenge the government. The international situation
also favoured a challenge. Chamoun and his foreign
minister, Charles Malik, were especially identified with
a pro-Western policy and in 1957 had accepted the
Elsenhower doctrine. Inevitably this action placed
Lebanon in opposition to Egypt, whose leader, Abd al-Nasir,
had become a hero for Lebanese Sunni Muslims and all
those who believed that Lebanon should pursue a Pan-Arab
policy.
The coalition of the National Front
which confronted Chamoun received a setback in the
parliamentary elections of 1958 when many of its leaders
were defeated. The National Front then turned to street
demonstrations and strikes. With large scale Arab
support particularly from Syria and Egypt, the National
Front used the 1958 union between Syria and Egypt to
inspire their followers to turn to violence.
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